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Labor Arbitration in the United States and Britain:
A Comparative Analysis
by Anthony F. Bartlett*t
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE United States and Britain share a common legal tradition and
enjoy an advanced stage of industrialization. As a result, it would
seem reasonable to anticipate relatively similar developments in their re-
spective labor relations and labor law systems. Such similarity has not
been evidenced, however, in either their labor relations structures or in
the responsiveness of labor law to them. Important points of divergence
indicate fundamental differences in approach on the part of the partici-
pants to collective bargaining, as well as by the legislative and judicial
branches of both countries. This is graphically illustrated by the varying
fortunes of the labor arbitration process in each jurisdiction.
In the United States, labor arbitration enjoys a preeminent position
in the collective bargaining process, shown by the overwhelming majority
of American collective agreements providing for the binding arbitration of
unresolved disputes. By contrast, British collective agreements rarely pro-
vide for arbitration. Its use is the exception rather than the rule. Most of
the American arbitration workload, known as grievance or "rights arbitra-
tion", consists of the interpretation or application of the terms found in
collective agreements. Some arbitral energy is also expended on the reso-
lution of disputes concerning the construction of the terms of a collective
agreement, known as "interest" arbitration.1 Such minimal arbitration as
exists in Britain is concerned normally with "interest" rather than
"rights" disputes. The consequences of this focus are serious because
much of the industrial unrest in Britain concerns problems at shop-floor
level which give rise to unofficial or "wildcat" strikes, matters which are
eminently susceptible to resolution through rights arbitration.
An additional factor worthy of note in a comparative examination of
*LL.B. (Queen's University, Belfast, Ireland) 1969; LL.M. (Queen's University, Bel-
fast, Ireland) 1970. Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law.
t The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful research assistance of Lynda Tep-
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the two systems involves the legal status of collective agreements. In the
United States, such agreements are considered binding as contracts and
may be subject to enforcement in court, whereas in Britain legally en-
forceable agreements are rare. At the risk of over-simplification, this
means that evasion of arbitration obligations under a collective agreement
is made difficult in the United States but is virtually invited in Britain.
Congress has made express statutory provision for the legal enforceability
of agreements but left the substantive terms to the wishes of the parties.
This construction ensured that labor arbitration in the United States
would be a creature of contract, while the absence of legal enforcement in
Britain ensured that the arbitration machinery would be left largely to
the legislature.
This article proposes to compare and evaluate the nature and extent
of labor arbitration as a dispute-resolution mechanism in the United
States and Britain. Such an undertaking would be incomplete, if not im-
possible, without a consideration of the relevant historical, social, and po-
litical factors which have contributed to the major differences in this im-
portant area of labor law and labor relations. This subject is addressed in
the hope of providing some insight into the systems which have produced
such markedly different labor arbitration processes. It should be noted,
however, that this article will be confined to a consideration of labor arbi-
tration in private industry.
' Section II deals with the manner in which" the development of collec-
tive bargaining influenced the attitudes of labor and management toward
third party determination of their differences.
Section III illustrates the crucial role played by the State in the re-
form of collective bargaining and how the differing nature of this role in
each jurisdiction ultimately influences the shape of their respective arbi-
tration systems.
Finally, section IV is concerned with the connection between the le-
gal enforcement of collective agreements and the extent of acceptance of
labor arbitration as an alternative to court enforcement of contractual
provisions. The attitude of the judiciary of both countries towards the
labor arbitration process is also considered.
II. ARBITRATION AND COLLEcTIVE BARGAINING
In Britain, governmental intervention in disputes between employers
and workers has a long history. However, the initial concern was with
regulating differences between individuals, such as an employer and a sin-
gle worker, rather than the relations between employers and organized
workers, and as such it preceded a capitalist industrial economy. Thus, by
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the provisions of the Statute of Apprentices in 1562,2 Parliament dele-
gated to Justices of the Peace the task of fixing the wage rates of workers
in their respective localities in accordance with the general price level.$
Various laws, from 1562 until an Act of Parliament in 1747," entrusted
these local magistrates with the determination of disputes between mas-
ters and individual workers.
Resolution of disputes in the cotton industry was sought in the provi-
sions of several applicable statutes, including the Cotton Arbitration Acts
of 1800,5 1803,6 1804,7 and 1813.8 Justices of the Peace had a less direct
role under these Acts; they were permitted to intervene only where ap-
pointed arbitrators had failed to resolve the differences referred to them.
The main problem with enforcement of the rights available under such
measures was that they depended to a large extent on the intrepedity of
the individual worker in processing a grievance against his employer, par-
ticularly as the British unions were in an embryonic stage of development
and functioned under a cloak of illegality.9 In the Arbitration Act of
1824,10 Parliament attempted the application of general arbitration provi-
sions, similar to those of the Cotton Arbitration Acts11 over trade and
manufacturing. This legislation proved to be a lamentable failure prima-
rily because increasing industrialization, by way of the factory system,
brought into existence concentrations of workers who were concerned
with wage rates to be paid in the future rather than rates for work al-
ready done. However, future rates were excluded from the scope of arbi-
tration under the Act.12 Two further attempts by the State to foster labor
' 5 Eliz. 1, ch. 4.
3 This was not the only task of the Justices under the Act but it was their most impor-
tant one, see C. MOTE, INDusTRIAL ARBITRATION 24-25 (1916).
" 20 Geo. 2, ch. 19.
39 & 40 Geo. 3, ch. 90.
6 43 Geo. 3, ch. 151.
7 44 Geo. 3, ch. 87.
8 53 Geo. 3, ch. 75.
9 See, I. SHARP, INDUSTRIAL CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION GREAT BRITAIN, 279 (1950).
Even within the limited sphere of the success of the Acts it is doubtful
whether arbitration touched many cases other than those in which the workmen
and employers would in any event have reached agreement without great diffi-
culty. Without mutual consent it must have been extremely difficult and danger-
ous for a workman to apply the provisions against his master .... Even arbitra-
tion of individual disputes required the supervisory protection of a collective body
which was, of course, impossible under the existing law.
10 5 Geo. 4, ch. 96.
1 These Acts were repealed in 1824, see 5 Geo. 4, ch. 96.
2 . SHARP, supra note 9, at 281. Further, Dr. Sharp observes, in relation to a Parlia-
mentary Committee's investigation of the failure of the Act:
A more fundamental reason which the committee did not give was that al-
ready mentioned in the case of the earlier arbitration, namely the absence of pro-
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arbitration resulted in the Councils of Conciliation Act, 1867,"1 and the
Arbitration (Masters and Workmen) Act, 1872,'14 both of which were dis-
appointing failures. The latter Act represented the last attempt in nine-
teenth century Britain to enforce the arbitration of disputes with a legal
sanction. 15
Attempts by employers and unions to construct voluntary mecha-
nisms for dispute resolution had a happier history. Boards of arbitration
were formed in various trades, but success was often sporadic. The first
board of any significant influence was formed in the hosiery trade at Not-
tingham, in Northeast England, by A.J. Mundella, an employer in the
trade and later an influential Member of Parliament. The board was
formed in 1860 and over the next two decades its example spread to other
important industries. Throughout this period, the terms "conciliation"
and "arbitration" were used interchangeably and often inaccurately. With
the wisdom of hindsight, we may validly conclude that the terms referred
to were attempts to foster collective bargaining rather than to implement
arbitration as we know it today. 6
In the United States, arbitration was not used until the 1860's and,
as in Britain, it reflected greater concern for union recognition and collec-
tive bargaining than for third party determination of disputes. 17 There
was little interest in State intervention and sponsorship of arbitration;
instead, unions and employers concentrated on building voluntary proce-
dures, although such private initiatives were hindered by the haphazard
spread of collective bargaining and the corresponding lack of definitive
contractual procedures. 8 Much of the pressure for "conciliation" and "ar-
bitration" was actually a plea for the establishment of collective bargain-
ing and union recognition. Thus, it was not uncommon to find employers
tection from victimization where an employee applied to a justice of the peace for
the reference of a dispute to arbitration against the wishes of the employer. On
the other hand, if the employer were willing that the matter at issue should be
referred, there was probably no need to invoke the provisions of the Act. I. SHARP.
supra note 9, at 282.
:3 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 105.
35 & 36 Vict., ch. 46.
1 I. SHARP, supra note 9, at 289.
10 Id. at 279.
The vital point in Mundell's experiment was the proposition that masters and men
should get around a table and 'talk it out' on a footing of equality. . .Constitutionally,
questions could be decided by majority vote, the chairman exercising a casting vote if neces-
sary. In practice, even this vestige of arbitration was dropped by Mundell, who saw to it
that decisions were arrived at by agreement.
17 W. HOLLEY AND K. JENNINGS, THE LABOR RELATIONS PROCESS, 269 (1980): Arbitration
was initially concerned with negotiating working conditions, particularly with having em-
ployers recognize the legitimate existence of labor unions.
Is Id. at 270.
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in both countries generally hostile to what then passed for arbitration,
while unions in general supported it. 19 Nevertheless, labor leaders were
hesitant to entrust many important matters to third party determination
despite their espousal of the process, as evidenced by the reluctance of
Samuel Gompers to extend the term "arbitration" much beyond
conciliation.
2 0
The development of labor arbitration was inextricably bound up with
the fate of the collective bargaining process. The attitudes of the legisla-
ture and judiciary on both sides of the Atlantic were crucial in determin-
ing not only the differing paths that their respective labor movements
were to take in the joint determination of working conditions with em-
ployers, but also in guiding their responses to third party determination
of disputes before a court of law as well as before an arbitrator. A brief
survey of labor relations history in both countries reveals that, initially,
the response of the State and the law to the nascent unions was generally
hostile. American unions had their very existence called into question in
the Cordwainers case,2 ' in 1806, where workers combining for the purpose
of improving their wages and working conditions was found actionable as
a criminal conspiracy. The rigidity of this particular judicial stance was
relaxed in 1842, in the case of Commonwealth v. Hunt,22 where it was
established that either the objectives of a union or the means used to
achieve them had to be criminal before an action for criminal conspiracy
could be grounded.
Judicial ingenuity was then concentrated on finding illegal the vari-
ous activities engaged in by unions. Thus, inducing workers to strike in
breach of their employment contracts became the tort of inducement to
breach contractual relations,23 picketing was thought to be inherently co-
ercive,24 and striking to compel an employer to hire only those workers
who belonged to a particular union was considered illegal.25 Judicial en-
mity was further evidenced by the over-issuance of injunctions in labor
disputes for the purpose of preventing or curtailing strikes, picketing, and
boycotts. 26 Furthermore, the Supreme Court gave its imprimatur to the
'9 JENSEN, Notes On The Beginnings of Collective Bargaining, 9 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 226, 228 (1956).
20 Id. at 230. Gompers certainly did not intend that matters pertaining to working con-
ditions should be turned over to third parties for decision. Rather, the intent was to secure
recognition from the employer and, if possible, to bargain, with him over the terms of em-
ployment prior to taking strike action.
21 Commonwealth v. Pullis, Mayors Court of Philadelphia, (1806).
22 45 Mass. (4 Metc.) 111, 38 Am. Dec. 346 (1842).
22 Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 (1871).
24 Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92 (1896).
25 Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492 (1900).
2' See GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 83-104 (1946).
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"yellow-dog" contract,17 an employee contract stipulating that during the
course of his employment an employee would not join a union or partici-
pate in union organizational activities; failure to comply would be
grounds for dismissal.
A further obstacle to the application of a union's collective bargain-
ing strength was the judicial extension of the terms of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act, 1890,18 to encompass the activities of a labor organization.2 9
Congress sought to give some protection to unions by the terms of the
Clayton Antitrust Act, 1914.0 However, the Supreme Court soon found a
means of circumventing the immunities of the Act by noting that it pro-
tected only the existence and operation of a union, it did not exempt the
activities of a union where the union engaged in unlawful activities even
in pursuit of legitimate objects.31 The attitude of the Supreme Court had
changed somewhat by the 1940s and it developed the concept of a "labor
exemption" from the strict application of the antitrust laws where the
applicable restraint of trade was merely an incidental consequence of a
union's pursuit of its legitimate collective bargaining function.32
British unions faced a similar form of hostility from the courts and,
initially, the legislature. As early as 1721, the act of combining to force an
employer to concede a wage increase was found actionable as a criminal
conspiracy.33 A series of anti-combination acts enacted between 1799 and
180034 made the very existence of a labor organization illegal. When these
acts were repealed in 1824'3 a wave of sometimes violent industrial un-
rest swept the country. Parliament responded by passing a statute which
expressly legalized certain combinations,"6 while at the same time re-
stricting much trade union activity through a section of the act which
27 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245
U.S. 229 (1917).
28 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-6 (1976).
29 Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976) which provides:
[T]he labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence
and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for
the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit,
or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully
carrying out the legitimate objects thereof, nor shall be held or construed to be
illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Dexing, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
22 U.S. v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1940).
22 Rex v. Journeymen Taylors of Cambridge, 88 Eng. Rep. 9 (1721).
24 Act to Prevent Unlawful Combinations of Workmen, 1799, 39 Geo. 3, ch. 81; Act to
Prevent Unlawful Combinations of Workmen, 1800, 39 & 40 Geo. 3, ch. 106.
26 Combination Laws Repeal Act, 1824, 5 Geo. 4, ch. 95.
26 Combination Act, 1825, 6 Geo. 4, ch. 129.
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established a number of loosely defined criminal offenses.3 7 These of-
fenses were meant to be restricted to circumstances where violence was
involved but an all to willing judiciary often applied them to otherwise
lawful union activity.38
A further hindrance to the functioning of unions was evidenced by
the application of the "restraint of trade doctrine" to union objectives
which left them open to actions for criminal conspiracy at common law.39
Parliament passed the Trade Union Act of 187140 with one intention be-
ing to free unions from illegality where their objectives were not in re-
straint of trade.41 Another statute of the same year, the Criminal Law
Amendment Act,42 restricted the definition of "threats" and "intimida-
tion" so that a mere threat to strike was no longer a statutory offense.
However, this protection was swiftly overthrown by a judge who held that
regardless of the statutory language the common law had not been abro-
gated, therefore, an act done with improper intent and amounting to an
unjustifiable interference with an employer's business was actionable as a
criminal conspiracy.43 The legislature sought to eliminate this loophole
37 Id. at § 3 stated:
[I]f any Person shall by Violence to the Person or Property, or by threats or
Intimidation, or by molesting or in any way obstructing another, force or endeavor
to force any Journeyman, Manufacturer, Workman or other Person hired or em-
ployed in any Manufacture, Trade or Business, to depart from his Hiring, Em-
ployment or Work, or to return to his Work before the same shall be finished, or
prevent or endeavor to prevent any Journeyman, Manufacturer or other Person
not being hired or employed from hiring himself to, or from accepting Work or
Employment from any Person or Persons; or if any Person shall use or employ
Violence to the person or property of another, or threats or Intimidation, or shall
molest in any way obstruct another for the Purpose of forcing or inducing such
Person to belong to any Club or Association, . . . or if any Person shall by Vio-
lence to the Person or Property of another, or by threats or to Intimidation, or by
molesting or in any way obstructing another, force or endeavor to force any Manu-
facturer or Person carrying on any Trade or Business, to make any Alteration in
his Mode of regulating, managing, conducting or carrying on such Manufacture,
Trade or Business, or to limit the Number of his Apprentices or the number or
description of his Journeymen, Workmen, or Servants; every Persqn so offending,
or aiding, abetting or assisting therein, being convicted thereof in Manner herein-
after mentioned, shall be imprisoned and kept to Hard Labour, for any time not
exceeding Three Calendar Months.
" Gregory, supra note 26, at 20-22.
" See, e.g., Hilton v. Eckersley, 119 Eng. Rep. 781 (1855).
34 & 35 Vict., ch. 31 (1871).
41 Id., at § 2 reads:
The purpose of any trade union shall not, by reason merely that they are in restraint of
trade, be deemed to be unlawful so as to render any member of such trade union liable to
criminal prosecution for conspiracy or otherwise.
42 34 & 35 Vict., ch. 32 (1871).
4' Reg. v. Blunn, 12 Cox. C.C. 316 (1872). In this case a threat to strike by London gas
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with the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, in 1875,44 in which it
was provided that an agreement or combination by two or more persons
to do or procure to be done any act in, contemplation or furtherance of a
trade dispute should not be actionable as a conspiracy if such act, com-
mitted by one person, would not be punishable as a crime.4 5 In 1901, the
House of Lords, Britain's highest court, held that the protection given to
unions by the 1875 Act from charges of criminal conspiracy did not ex-
tend to actions based on civil conspiracy.4 In addition, in its infamous
Taff Vale47 decision of 1901, the House of Lords held that a trade union
could be sued in its own name for a tortious action and that a judgment
for damages could be met from union funds.'8 Protection of union funds
from such actions and immunity from actions for civil conspiracy were
accorded by the Trade Disputes Act, 1906.
41
Thus far the pattern is a familiar one to American observers. First
comes a judicial imposition of liability upon unions; next, a conferral of
immunity from this liability from the legislature; followed by judicial cir-
cumvention of the statutory protection accorded. However, in Britain, ju-
dicial enmity towards unions continued well into the 1960s. In Rookes v.
Barnard,50 the House of Lords undermined one of the most basic union
sanctions given protection by the 1906 Trade Disputes Act, the right of a
union to require its members to cease working even in breach of their
individual employment contracts. What would otherwise have been the
tort of inducement to breach contractual relations was made unenforce-
able by the Act.5 1 Nonetheless, the Law Lords were prepared to find that
although the completed act of striking was immunized, the act of threat-
ening to withdraw labor was not so protected and as a result constituted
the tort of intimidation. Those guilty of the commission of this tort were,
therefore, liable for civil conspiracy.5 2 This decision rocked the British
workers to secure the reinstatement of a colleague discharged for taking part in union activ-
ity resulted in their being prosecuted for criminal conspiracy and sentenced to twelve
months' imprisonment.
38 & 39 Vict., ch. 86 (1875).
Id. at § 3.
48 Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] A.C. 495.
47 Taff Vale Ry. Co. v. Amalgamated Soc'y of Ry. Servants, [1901] A.C. 426.
48 Id. at 438.
41 6 Edw. 7, ch. 47 (1906).
80 Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129.
51 Trade Disputes Act, supra note 49 at § 3 which stated:
An act done by a person in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute
shall not be actionable on the ground only that it induces some other person to
break a contract of employment or that it is an interference with the trade, busi-
ness, or employment of some other person, or with the right of some other person
to dispose of his capital or his labour as he wills.
82 Rookes, supra note 50, at 1143. Observing a certain lack of logical consistency in
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labor law community which had long felt that the law relating to unions
and employers had been settled after 1906.58 Once again, Parliament had
to intercede to protect unions from yet another judicially created liability;
the result was the passage of the Trade Disputes Act, in 1965." It is little
wonder, then, that a popular British work on labor law opens with the
observation that: "[m]ost workers want nothing more of the law than that
it should leave them alone. In this they can be said to display an instinct
that is fundamental to British industrial relations." 55
III. STATE INTERVENTION
In the United States, as in Britain, it became evident that some legis-
lative initiative was required to meet the demands of a collective bargain-
ing system which was becoming increasingly sophisticated, too sophisti-
cated to fit within the traditional mold of the common law. The Norris-
LaGuardia Act of 193256 confronted the evils of "government by injunc-
tion' '57 and the yellow-dog contract; it was very successful in dealing with
the former, but less so with the latter as, by its terms, the yellow-dog
contract was not made illegal but merely unenforceable.5 8 Although such
legislation was useful in remedying certain specific abuses, it was inade-
quate for dealing with the need for the comprehensive reform of collective
bargaining which was required in the mid-1930's. Earlier, Congress had
passed the Railway Labor Act, in 1926,51 with the objective of establish-
holding a threat to strike actionable while the strike itself was not, Lord Donovan noted, in
the Court of Appeals, Rookes v. Barnard, (1963) 1 Q.B. 623, 683:
"If that be the true position, as I think it is, then the situation is reached...
that a strike is not unlawful, but the threat to do so is. In other words, the policy
which workmen should pursue in order to avoid liability is to strike first and
negotiate afterwards." (Emphasis supplied).
53 See, C. GRUNFELD, MODERN TRADE UNION LAW, 439 (1966):
What startled the trade union world was that, after the Trade Disputes Act,
1906, and more than half a century of case law, in which the courts had shown a
deepening understanding of the vital role of the trade unions in running British
industry and their need to enjoy freedom of economic action to protect the legiti-
mate interests of their members, there still remained coiled in the common law
the possibility of an action against union officials for crushing damages and costs
for threatening strike action in the breach of contracts of employment, whether to
remove an objectionable employee.., or to pursue any other industrial purpose,
like a claim in respect of wages or any other term or conditions of employment.
54 Trade Dispute Act, 1965, c. 48, § 1.
15 K. WEDDERBURN, THE WORKER AND Tim LAW 13 (2d Ed. 1971).
50 Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101-115 (1973).
'" See. H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PRocEss 339 (1968).
58 E. BEAL, E. WICKERSHAM & P. KIENAST, THE PRACTICE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
138 (1976).
589 Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151-88 (1976).
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ing stable labor relations in that industry. Subsequently, the administra-
tion of President Franklin D. Roosevelt sought an even more ambitious
objective, that of regulating labor relations over industry in general.
The Roosevelt administration initially sought to regulate industry la-
bor relations in § 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933,0
but this statute was invalidated on constitutional grounds."' In 1935, the
National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act)6 2 was passed and the
Roosevelt administration made known to the Supreme- Court its determi-
nation to save this measure from being declared invalid as an unconstitu-
tional regulation of interstate commerce." Whatever may have motivated
the Court, the Act was upheld on constitutional grounds in 1937." The
Wagner Act established procedures for requiring the recognition of a
union which could demonstrate that it represented a majority of the ap-
plicable work force6 5 and enumerated "unfair labor practices '6 6 which
could be leveled against an employer who engaged in proscribed anti-
union conduct or conduct aimed at individual employees. The Act also
provided for an administrative agency, the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB), to enforce the unfair labor practice jurisdiction and su-
pervise electoral procedures.
No similar initiative was undertaken in Britain during this period.
Earlier British administrations contented themselves with addressing
problems as they arose and passing specific pieces of legislation to deal
with the perceived evil in question, but comprehensive regulation of col-
lective bargaining was not yet attempted. 7 In the hope of providing for
00 National Industrial Recovery Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 701-02 (repealed 1935).
61 Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
02 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976).
'3 President Roosevelt had made public his intention to appoint a sufficient number of
Justices to get the Act validated. For details of his "Court-packing" strategy see R. CORT-
NER, THE WAGNER AcT CASES, 150-155 (1964).
N.L.R.B. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). What happened in
between these two historic court decisions? For one thing, the sit-down strikes, which
alarmed the nation. For another, the national elections of 1936, which returned President
Franklin D. Roosevelt to the White House by the greatest majority ever-up to that time.
Critics of the conservative Supreme Court of that era had called its members, contemptu-
ously, "nine old men." Now they allowed that it consisted of nine old men who read the
election returns. See also Beal, supra note 58, at 44.
05 National Labor Relations Act, supra note 62, at § 159.
00 Id. at § 158.
07 0. KAHN-FREUND, LABOUR RELATIONS AND THE LAW 23 (1965):
The principal reason for making the forgoing general observations was to pro-
vide a background for the, at first sight, astonishing fact in a country in which
collective bargaining is so highly developed and of such comparatively ancient ori-
gin, the bulk of collective bargaining and collective agreements continues to exist
outside the law and without any development of a "collective labour law" of any
major proportions.
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the peaceful resolution of industrial disputes, Parliament passed the Con-
ciliation Act of 1896,8 which provided governmental machinery for con-
ciliation and arbitration which the disputants could use if they so de-
sired.69 Later, Parliament provided additional machinery under the
Industrial Courts Act of 1919,70 but its use remained voluntary. Experi-
ence under both statutes demonstrated that unions and employers were
not partial to the concept of third party intervention into their private
disputes, as shown by the apparent underutilization of the machinery and
procedures provided.7 1 One could conclude that Parliament thus seemed
ignorant of the fact that arbitration and conciliation were not widely ac-
cepted in British labor relations, particularly by the unions.7 2 An impor-
tant factor in his phenomenon was growth and strength of the trade un-
ions, 7 3 many being mature and stable organizations which, by this time,
felt capable of dealing with employers by exercising collective bargaining
strength rather than by using a procedure which in the past had sought
as its goal recognition rather than actual conciliation or arbitration.
Dislike of legal intervention in labor relations had become an estab-
lished part of British trade union lore, but this was far from being the
case in the United States. American unions welcomed the passage of the
Wagner Act and for many of them the existence of the Act was critical for
their survival.7 5 In fact, several present day unions came into being dur-
ing this period s. 7 Therefore, the Wagner Act aided in the development of
strong representative unions. The affirmative obligation of employers to
bargain with the unions" led to many stable collective bargaining rela-
tionships and the widespread use of collective agreements, features which
were to prove crucial in the establishment of a labor arbitration system.
See also PHELPS-BROWN, THE GROWTH OF BRITISH INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 355 (1959): "When
British industrial relations are compared with those of the other democracies they stand out
because they are so little regulated by law."
e8 59 & 60 Vict., ch. 30 (1896).
'9 For a description of the conciliation and arbitration of this Act, see, WRITTEN Evi-
DENCE OF THE MINISTRY OF LABOUR (to the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Em-
ployers' Association), 94-96 (1965).
70 9 & 10 Geo. 5, ch. 69 (1919).
71 WRITTEN EVIDENCE, supra note 69, at 111.
72 H. PELLING, A HISTORY OF BRITISH TRADE UNIONISM, 121-122 (1976).
73 By the end of the nineteenth century trade unions had become firmly established not
only among skilled craftsman but also among unskilled and semi-skilled workers, see, B.
COOPER & A. BARTLETT, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS-A STUDY IN CONFLICT 11-13 (1976).
7' Wedderburn, supra note 55, at 317. Referring to the Taff Vale decision Professor
Wedderburn notes: "Election posters of 1906 depicted a judge handing to an employer a
scourge with which to beat workers. The Taff Vale case became part of working-class cul-
ture, part of the way 'they' treat trade unions if they can. Such feelings have not died."
71 A. SLOANE & F. WHITNEY, LABOR RELATIONS at 115 (3d ed. 1977).
78 See G. FINK, LABOR UNIONS 23-26, 357-359 (1977).
77 National Labor Relation Act (Wagner Act) 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1935).
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Arbitration as such was not widespread before the Second World
War. During the War, the National War Labor Board was established by
Executive order.78 Its function was to resolve those disputes which af-
fected or threatened to impede war production.79 Often the Board would
require in a collective agreement the inclusion of a clause requiring the
arbitration of future disputes.s0 In this way, the parties were exposed to
the advantages of this particular form of dispute resolution; such advan-
tages sustained its use and popularity even after both the War and the
War Labor Board had passed into history."" In Britain, compulsory arbi-
tration was imposed for the duration of the War and continued to exist
for a short period thereafter.82 Enjoying some support from the unions,8 3
when finally revoked, compulsory arbitration left behind no habit or cus-
tom of referring disputes to an arbitrator, unlike the case in many areas
of American industry.
IV. ARBITRATION AND LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS
The continued development of labor arbitration in the United States
was made possible by a major legislative innovation, the passage of the
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley), in 1947.1 The Taft-
Hartley amendment to the National Labor Relations Act was felt neces-
sary by Congress as a response to mounting criticisms of the Act as being
weighted against employers, 5 coupled with public concern over the large
scale industrial unrest in 1946.86 For purposes of labor arbitration, the
most significant part of the Act was section 3017 which provided for the
legal enforcement of collective agreements. This was to prove a boon to
78 Loewenberg, Compulsory Arbitration in the United States, in COMPULSORY ARBITRA-
TION, AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 141, 143 (1976).
7 H. METZ, LABOR POLICY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, 263-66 (1945).
80 Id. at 62.
81 F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOUm, How ARBITRATION WORKS 15 (3d ed. 1979).
82 Cooper & Bartlett, supra note 73, at 96.
83 Bob Hepple, Compulsory Arbitration in Great Britain, in COMPULSORY ARBITRATION,
AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 83, 86 (1976).
" Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley) 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144 (1976).
85 W. E. OBERER & K. HANSLOWE, LABOR LAW: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN A FREE SocI-
ETY 149-50 (1972).
88 EUGENE HAGBURG & M.J. LEVINE, LABOR RELATIONS: AN INTEGRATED PERSPECTIVE 195
(1978).
87 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1978):
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chap-
ter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
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the increased use of arbitration for dispute settlement because evasion of
contractually agreed arbitration provisions could result in the prosecution
of the offending party. A new respectability was thus extended to the ar-
bitration process because obligations in this area could not be taken
lightly. However, in spite of the collective bargaining advantages offered
by 301, a serious challenge against the section was building on constitu-
tional grounds,8 8 and the actual fate of the provision was unclear until
1957. In that year, the Supreme Court vindicated the constitutional sta-
tus of section 301 in the celebrated Lincoln Mills decision,8 which pro-
vided Justice Douglas with an opportunity to present an extraordinarily
creative defense of the section along with an elaboration of the objectives
of the national labor policy.90
Prior to the Lincoln Mills decision, the legal status of collective
agreements had been unclear. The common law approach indicated that
they were unenforceable at law, and attempts by various U.S. courts to
make them binding under doctrines of agency, implication, or other
means proved largely unworkable, for both theoretical and practical pur-
poses.9 1 These difficulties were resolved for Americans, but, in Britain the
original attitude toward collective agreements, that of being "binding in
honor only," was restated by a British court as recently as 1969.9
In Britain, comprehensive reform of the collective bargaining system
was finally attempted in 1971 with the passage of the Industrial Relations
Act.93 This Act may be interpreted to have incorporated many American
measures such as determination of bargaining agents by election, and the
establishment of standards for the furtherance of internal union democ-
racy. 94 Section 34 of this Act made all future written collective agree-
ments legally binding unless the parties stipulated to the contrary.95
However, most unions and employers took advantage of this escape de-
88 Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 348
U.S. 437 (1955).
8 Textile Workers of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
90 Id. at 456-57.
" Anthony F. Bartlett & D.R. Lowry, Collective Agreements in the United States and
Britain: Status and Consequences, 1979 UTAH L. REV., 469, n.3, 470-76.
82 Ford Motor Co. Ltd. v. Amalgamated Union of Eng'g & Foundry W 2 Q.B. 303
(1969).
" Industrial Relations Act, 1971, c. 72.
See H. Sandison, A Rejected Transplant: The British Industrial Relations Act
(1971-1974), 3 INDus. REL. L. J. No. 2247 (1979).
" Industrial Relations Act, 1971, ch. 72, § 34 reads in pertinent part:
(1) Every collective agreement which-
(a) is made in writing after the commencement of this act, and
(b) does not contain a provision which (however expressed) states that the agree-
ment or part of it is intended not be legally enforceable, shall be conclusively
presumed to be intended by the parties to it to be a legally enforceable contract.
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vice and constructed appropriate clauses to ensure that their agreements
were binding in honor only."6
The unions were implacably opposed to the Industrial Relations Act
from its very inception and they worked actively for its repeal. This illus-
trates a major difference between the political strategies of British unions
and that of their American counterparts. British unions have had a politi-
cal party, the Labour Party, to which they normally have given not only
their allegiance but also a major portion of funding.9 7 While the British
Labour Party is by no means only a party of the unions, they exercise a
great deal of influence on it, both financially and as a result of the Party's
traditional appeal to working people.
American unions worked actively against the Taft-Hartley amend-
ment in 1947 but, unlike their British counterparts, they had no distinct
political party of their own.ss Instead, they relied on the traditional policy
of American unions, that "labor will reward its friends and punish its ene-
mies."90' Had American labor been successful in overthrowing the Taft-
Hartley amendment, section 301 would have inevitably perished and la-
bor arbitration in the United States could not have achieved its present
status.
In contrast, British labor, which has had a direct influence on one of
the major British parties, was successful in opposing Britain's equivalent
to the Taft-Hartley amendment. 100 This was unfortunate for the propo-
nents of arbitration because a fundamental purpose of the statute had
been the establishment of procedures for the settlement of disputes
through conciliation and arbitration.10 1 When the Labour Party returned
96 COOPER & BARTLETT, supra note 73, at 119: ".... the parties continued to express the
wish for collective agreements to be binding in honour only; therefore a great deal of legal
energy was expended on drawing up non-enforceability clauses-popularly termed TINA
LEA (This is not a Legally Enforceable Agreement)."
97 E. CARTER & R. MEARS, A HISTORY OF BRITAIN 932 (1937).
98 Organized labor tends to lend its support to the Democratic Party, but not invaria-
bly; see HOLLEY & JENNINGS, supra note 17, at 65-66.
99 Id. at 155.
100 The unrest generated by the Act prompted Professor K.W. Wedderburn to term it,
.the government's industrial Vietnam. . ." The Observer, April 1, 1973 at 12, col. 3.
See also Lloyd, Last Act, 56 INDUSTRIAL Soc'Y 8, 9 (1974).
101 Industrial Relations Act, 1971, c. 72, § 1 in pertinent part:
(1) The provisions of this Act shall have effect for the purpose of promoting good
industrial relations in accordance with the following principles...
(b) the principle of developing and maintaining orderly procedures in in-
dustry for the peaceful and expeditious settlement of disputes by negotia-
tion, conciliation or arbitration, with due regard to the general interests of
the community;...
Further, in its Industrial Relations Code of Practice (1972) the Dep't. of Employment
(equivalent of U.S. Dep't. of Labor) advocated at 27:
Independent conciliation and arbitration can be used to settle all types of disputes
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to power, true to one of its major election promises, it repealed the Indus-
trial Relations Act by passing the Trade Union and Labor Relations Act
in 1974.102 Section 18 of the 1974 Act reinstituted the former status of
collective agreements at common law so that they remain unenforceable
unless the parties provide specifically for enforcement.1 3
While legal enforcement of collective agreements proved antithetical
to the prevailing trends in British labor law, it had become an accepted
part of the American scene. The Supreme Court, while developing a fed-
eral substantive law relating to labor contracts, had occasion to examine
the nature of the labor arbitration process and, in particular, its position
in relation to the courts. A prior fear of American unions had been the
prospect of legal intervention in labor relations; while this spectre had
been largely laid to rest, it reappeared in a threatened judicial intrusion
into voluntary labor arbitration procedures agreed upon by the parties.
Echoing a widespread judicial sentiment, a New York court, in the notori-
ous Cutler-Hammer decision,1°4 observed that if the meaning of a con-
tractual provision, which one of the parties purports to arbitrate, is be-
yond dispute there cannot be anything to arbitrate. The labor contract in
such an instance cannot be said to have provided for arbitration of the
disputed matter. 0 5 This would have meant that judges alone should de-
termine whether or not a subject was arbitrable and that they could ex-
amine the merits of the dispute, despite the fact that both union and
employer had contracted for private determination of their differences.
The Supreme Court gave a fundamental boost to the labor arbitra-
tion process in its seminal Steelworkers' Trilogy,10 s a set of decisions in
which it virtually eliminated the possibility of an interventionist role for
the judiciary. As the Court perceived it, judicial participation was limited
if the parties concerned agree that they should. Arbitration by the Industrial Arbi-
tration Board or other independent arbitrators is particularly suitable for settling
disputes of right, and its wider use for that purpose is desirable. Where it is used
the parties should undertake to be bound by the award (emphasis added).
102 Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974, c. 52.
103 Id. § 18 in pertinent part:
[A]ny collective agreement made before 1st December 1971 or after the com-
mencement of this section shall be conclusively presumed not to have been in-
tended by the parties to be a legally enforceable contract unless the agreement-
(a) is in writing, and (b) contains a provision which (however expressed)
states that the parties intended that the agreement shall be a legally en-
forceable contract.
104 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 A.D. 917, 67 N.Y.S.
2d 317 (1947), af'd, 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E. 2d 464 (1947).
105 Id. at 918, 67 N.Y.S. 2d at 318.
106 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelwork-
ers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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to ascertaining whether or not the applicable collective agreement pro-
vided for arbitration. 10 7 If arbitration is required, then the dispute must
be referred to an arbitrator, even if a court might think a particular griev-
ance to be without merit or patently frivolous. s08 Any doubt as to the
arbitrability of a dispute was to be resolved in favor of arbitration. 10 9 The
Court concluded that an arbitrator, by applying the common law of the
shop or industry, was in possession of an expertise which the "ablest
judge" could not share." 0 The glowing terms in which the Court de-
scribed the labor arbitration process were welcomed by some prominent
arbitrators who, while partial to the compliments paid them, were critical
nonetheless of the theoretical basis of the Court's explanation of the func-
tion of labor arbitration."'
The most likely explanation for the excessive bestowal of praise upon
the process was the desire by the Supreme Court to halt the intrusion of
lower courts into the system; their utterances being, in effect, an alloca-
tion of jurisdiction upon arbitrators.1 2 The Court further established
107 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
108 Id. at 568.
109 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-583
(1960).
110 Id. at 582.
11 See, e.g., Davey, The Supreme Court and Arbitration: The Musings of an Arbitra-
tor, 36 NOTRE DAMS LAW. 138, 140 (1961):
Arbitrators, being human, cannot fail to be impressed with the respect which the
Court manifests for the superior knowledge, ability and wisdom of arbitrators.
This deference to the specialized knowledge of arbitrators, which the Court feels
apparently cannot be equaled by the "ablest judge" is certainly most gracious. At
the risk of appearing ungrateful and traitorous to the arbitration profession, I
shall venture the observation that such unstinted praise is in many cases probably
not deserved.
See also Feller, Arbitration: The Days of its Glory are Numbered, 2 INDUS. REL. L. J. 97, 98
(1978).
112 AARON, ARBITRATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: AFTERMATH OF THE TRILOGY, PROCEED-
INGS OF THE FIFTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 60, 61-62
(1962):
Apparently, the promptness with which the district and circuit courts of appeals
fell into line in applying the new federal law of arbitration is attributable in major
part to the wide-ranging dicta in the Supreme Court opinions which have evoked
so much adverse comment ... Although the exuberant language in the Court's
opinions has been widely deplored by practitioners and occasionally regretted by
arbitrators, it seems to have accomplished the intended results. While emitting
occasional literary grunts of disapproval or sighs of resignation, the great majority
of federal district and circuit court judges have seen their duty clearly and have
done it.
Not everybody was as enamoured of the arbitration process as the Supreme Court seemed
to be; for an interesting critique of the process from a former arbitrator see, P. HAYS, LABOR
ARBITRATION: A DISSENTING VIEW (1966).
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principles pertaining to the enforcement of collective agreements in light
of national labor policy, rather than traditional contract law, in a number
of decisions which were to prove significant for both labor arbitrators and
the parties to collective bargaining.113 As an example, one decision noted
that under certain circumstances an arbitration obligation might survive
even the merger or takeover of the company involved because although
contract law would not bind an unconsenting successor, "a collective
agreement is not an ordinary contract." 1
The replication of this success story was rendered impossible in Brit-
ain with the repeal of the Industrial Relations Act and its section 34. The
Labour government, which supervised the Act's repeal, attempted to
strengthen voluntary collective bargaining with the establishment of a
Conciliation and Arbitration Service in 1974, and giving it a statutory ba-
sis with the Employment Protection Act of 1975.115 Like its American
counterpart, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, the Service
is entrusted with an arbitration function, in addition to its principal task
of providing dispute resolution assistance and advisory services to both
unions and employers.11 6 Its title was changed to the Advisory Concilia-
tion and Arbitration Service (ACAS), thus stressing its advisory function.
As could be easily predicted in a collective bargaining system which has
traditionally accorded little importance to labor arbitration, the over-
whelming bulk of the ACAS workload consists of conciliaton rather than
113 See, e.g., Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Dowd Box Co. v.
Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962); Drake Bakeries, Inc., v. Local 50 Am. Bakery and Confec-
tionary Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962);
Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); and Buffalo Forge Co. v.
United Steelworkers of Am., 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
114 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964). But see, Howard
Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., Hotel Employees Int'l Union, 417 U.S.
249 (1974). See also, Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L.R. 601, 604 (1956):
In my judgment it is a mistake to attempt to force agreemnents between labor un-
ions and employers into more familiar legal pigeonholes'such as usage, third party
beneficiary contracts, or contracts negotiated by the union as agent for the em-
ployees as principals .... The group interests ... may conflict with the claims
of individuals because several classes of individuals have divergent interests, be-
cause the demands of group organization and coherence clash with individual self-
interest, or even because the union officialdom is not immediately responsive to
the wishes of a numerical majority of the members. Since experience offers no
factual parallel to these arrangements, no other legal conception is quite analo-
gous. (emphasis added)
I' Employment Protection Act, 1975, ch. 71. For an excellent treatment of the Em-
ployment Protection Act of 1975 see S. ANDFRmAN, EMPLOyMENT PROTECTION: A NEw LEGAL
FRAMEWORK (1976).
11 For a description of the varied tasks undertaken by the ACAS see, R. Rmzouv,
PINCIPLES oF LABOUR LAW 231-237 (3rd ed. 1979).
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arbitration, 117 and much of this workload exists because of statutory re-
ferrals to conciliation.11 The departure from arbitration and legal en-
forcement of collective agreements is made all the more regrettable be-
cause of an ailment which has long plagued British industry, the
unofficial or "wildcat" strike.-"' This problem was exacerbated, in the
view of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associa-
tions (The Donovan Commission),' 20 by conflict between what it termed
the formal and informal systems of collective bargaining in British
industry."'
The formal system of collective bargaining is apparent in the exis-
tence of national and industry-wide agreements drawn up between repre-
sentative unions and employers' associations. These agreements stipulate
the applicable terms and conditions and are followed in the undertakings
which they cover. In the informal system each local factory management
and union branch negotiate terms and conditions which make the na-
tional or industry-wide agreement a mere starting point for local addi-
tions. 22 The Donovan Commission's report emphasized the prevalence of
the informal system and the dichotomy which followed between it and an
apparatus based on the formal system: "The informal system is founded
on reality, recognizing that organizations on both sides of industry are not
strong. Central trade union organization is weak, and employers' associa-
tions are weaker.'
2
The reality, then, is that Britain has an actual system of local regula-
tion of terms and conditions similar to that of the United States, in which
one union normally negotiates with one employer to construct an agree-
ment which covers a particular plant. Where the American industry-wide
17 Wood, Conciliation and Arbitration in Great Britain, 1976-1977, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE THIRTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS: TRUTH, Li DE-
TECTORS, AND OTHER PROBLEMS IN LABOR ARBITRATION, 403, 405-406 (J. Stern and B. Dennis
ed. 1979).
It is noteworthy that whereas the pattern of ACAS work shows a continued in-
crease, the figures for arbitration are static. There is really no readily apparent
reason for this. One point must be stressed. In the United Kingdom arbitration is
to some extent regarded by conciliators as a failure. Their aim is to settle the
problem without there being further processes. In this area arbitration is far from
being the accepted and easy method of settling a dispute.
I1s Id. at 404.
119 R. HYMAN, STRIKES 36-37 (1978).
120 ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYER'S ASSOCIATIONS, DONovAN RE-
PORT, Cmnd. 3623 (1968).
1 Id. at 12. "Britain has two systems of industrial relations. The one is the formal
system embodied in the official institutions. The other is the informal system created by the
actual behavior of trade unions and employers' associations, of managers, shop stewards and
workers."
122 See id. at 36.
's Id. at 12.
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agreement applies locally, it usually provides for local, not national or
industry-wide, enforcement through arbitration. However, appropriate
plant-wide or local agreements are not available in Britain because of ad-
herence to the formal system.124 The Donovan Commission noted that
much of the "wildcat" strike problem concerned disputes which were ap-
propriate for resolution on a local level.1 25 Among its proposals for reform
of the British system, the Commission recommended the establishment of
local agreements dealing with local matters, leaving the national or indus-
try-wide agreement to cover more general issues. 126 In this proposed re-
form, the Commission envisaged a role for arbitration of disputed matters
at plant level1 27 but, surprisingly, did not propose that collective agree-
124 Id. at 36.
The formal and informal systems are in conflict. The informal system undermines
the regulative effect of industry-wide agreements. The gap between industry-wide
agreed rates and actual earnings continues to grow. Procedure agreements fail to
cope adequately with disputes arising within factories. Nevertheless, the assump-
tions of the formal system still exert a powerful influence over men's minds and
prevent the informal system from developing into an effective and orderly
method of regulation. (emphasis added)
'25 See id. at 100:
[A]bout half of all unofficial strikes-about 1,052 a year--concern wages ...
[A]fter wages the next most prolific immediate causes of disputes are 'working
arrangements, rules and discipline' (644 or 29 percent of the total) and 'redun-
dancy, dismissal, suspension, etc.' (326 or 15 percent of the total). These are mat-
ters which are normally dealt with at the work place and not at industry level; the
prevalence of stoppages due to these causes is a reflection on the adequacy of the
procedures available to settle them.
Id. at 100.
126 Id. at 262-263. See also, R. RDEOUT, TRADE UNIoNs-SoMEx SocL AND LEGAL
PROBLEMS, 52 (1964):
The chief argument against the removal of restrictions on strikes arising from in-
dustrial disputes and, indeed, in favour of increasing them, lies in the present
prevalence of unofficial strikes .... It is suggested, however, that since most
strikes . . . arise from dissatisfaction with the existing industrial situation, we
should best control strikes by improving the machinery for settling such disputes.
127 DONOVAN REPORT, supra note 121., id. at 100, where it is noted:
When collective bargaining has been reformed, however, and companies negotiate
comprehensive and effective agreements, the parties may conclude that their ar-
rangements would be strengthened by providing for arbitration on all unresolved
differences relating to the application of the agreement during its currency (which
might have to be for a fixed term), with voluntary acceptance of the resulting
awards as binding. Disputes over the application of the terms of company agree-
ments would go through the company procedure only before submission, if un-
resolved, to arbitration. Provision on these lines, which would mean that a "peace
obligation" would be accepted during the currency of an agreement, could be of
great importance. It could be introduced now in companies which make their own
agreements. Where it is introduced it will be necessary to provide machinery for
arbitration which can work speedily and on the spot.
In this country arbitration is commonly used when the parties have failed to reach
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ments be made legally enforceable. 2 '
V. CONCLUSION
In the period from the end of the Second World War until 1957, the
use of labor arbitration clauses in American collective agreements grew on
a voluntary basis to the extent that this method of dispute resolution was
provided for in over 90 percent of the labor contracts; 2 , in the decade
following the 1956 Lincoln Mills decision, the use of labor arbitration
clauses was firmly established in over 94 percent of such agreements. 3 0
However, this robust system could not have achieved its present status
without fulfilling certain prerequisites; these include stable collective bar-
gaining relationships and their end product, legally enforceable collective
agreements. In turn, these factors have required both comprehensive leg-
islative intervention, promoted by a determined administration, and a
high level of judicial creativity amounting to a judicial stance of self-ab-
negation in relation to the labor arbitration process. Nonetheless, Con-
gress and the Supreme Court could only take limited action to assist in
voluntary third-party resolution of labor disputes; they provided the
structural underpinnings, implementation was left to the parties.
Timing has been important in this respect. In the 1930's, many
American unions turned to the law, specifically to the Wagner Act, for
help in their organizing. Further, experience under this Act had demon-
strated that labor could go to a tribunal with their complaints and have
decisions rendered based on the law and not on anti-union sentiment;
such was the impact of the NLRB. In addition, many of the more author-
agreement on a proposal for changing terms and conditions of employment. It is
sometimes suggested that its more widespread use to interpret agreements might
help to avoid unofficial strikes.
The introduction of this kind of arbitration into the existing unsatisfactory proce-
dures of most industries would solve nothing .... when collective bargaining has
been reformed, however, and companies negotiate comprehensive and effective
agreements, the parties may conclude that their arrangements would be strength-
ened by providing for arbitration on all unresolved differences relating to the ap-
plication of the agreement during its currency . . . with voluntary acceptance of
the resulting award as binding.
128 Id. at 268. See also R. RIDEOUT, supra note 116, at 244:
It may still be argued that if contractual enforceability has the theoretical advan-
tages previously outlined this retreat in favour of conservation is unjustified. The
problem, however, is more intractable than one merely of persuading hidebound
trade unionists to change their minds. It is one of persuading those who have no
need of legal intervention that it's beneficial to them.
'29 Davey, Labor Arbitration: A Current Appraisal, 9 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 85
(1955).
120 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T. OF LABOR, Bul. No. 1425-6. MAJOR COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: ARBITRATION PROCEDURES (1966).
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itative American courts, following the Supreme Court, had begun to
adopt a more sympathetic stance towards the objectives of organized la-
bor. In short, American unions did not develop a dislike of the law in the
manner of their British counterparts, but instead, frequently resorted to
it. Thus, the job of the National War Labor Board was made easier and
the parties voluntarily adopted its arbitration recommendations. This re-
sponsiveness led in turn to a widespread acceptance of arbitration for a
period which was long enough for labor and management to grow accus-
tomed to using it as an alternative to industrial strife.
In Britain, unions had developed and matured much earlier than was
the case in the United States; this meant that historically the unions sur-
vived and flourished not because of the law, but rather, in spite of it.13 1
They could hardly have been expected to entrust their destiny to tribu-
nals which had so clearly demonstrated their anti-union animus, and so
they concentrated instead on exerting pressure upon Parliament through
the Labour Party. The consequences were unfortunate; when a British
administration finally resolved to pass comprehensive legislation to re-
form collective bargaining, British Unions, unlike their American counter-
parts in relation to the Taft-Hartley Act, were in a position to work di-
rectly for the downfall of this measure. So, future reform of collective
bargaining in Britain will most likely be in the traditional manner,
through the passage of piecemeal legislation, addressing each problem as
it arises.1 32
Meanwhile, conflict between the formal and inforinal systems of col-
lective bargaining, highlighted by the Report of the Donovan Commis-
sion, continues. Therefore, it seems appropriate to cautiously tender some
suggestions for reform of the British system of labor arbitration, based on
the American experience. At worst, this will produce only futile (but
harmless) speculation and, at best, it might suggest viable alternatives to
industrial conflict in the future. Probably, the most significant lesson ob-
tained from the United States is that initiatives in relation to labor arbi-
tration must come from the legislature. Experience has shown that volun-
tary resort to arbitration is not considered feasible in British collective
bargaining. The unions have unequivocally manifested both their hostility
to comprehensive labor relations legislation and their ability to under-
mine it. Therefore, any proposed changes must be piecemeal in nature;
"' K. WEDDERBURN, supra note 55 at 304:
In 1800 trade unions were utterly illegal. That fact remains today a critical feature
of their legal situation. The explanation of this paradox will provide us with the
key to the peculiar structure of our law concerning trade unions and industrial
conflict. The most powerful influence on that law,. has been the unions' strug-
gle to emerge from that illegality.
132 B. COOPER & A. BARTLrrr, supra note 73, at 32.
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and, such changes must clearly establish the rights and obligations of un-
ions as well as minimize the degree of judicial abstention of their Ameri-
can counterparts.
The question of legal enforceability of collective agreements must
first be met squarely and courageously by a future British Government.
Anticipating the obvious objection that this has been tried and rejected,
it must be borne in mind that the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 was
rejected as a package; it does not follow that legal enforceability would
have perished as a measure standing alone. And, to the objection that the
parties contracted themselves out of legal enforcement, it must be
pointed out that the Act invited this by providing an escape clause. A
new Government initiative on legal enforceability might succeed if no es-
cape measure was provided, and if the sponsoring administration could
hold its ground against union opposition long enough for the measure to
have a chance of acceptance as being the normal, and not the eccentric,
thing to do, as expressed by a dissenting voice on the Donovan
Commission.138
However, legal enforcement of the present day British collective
agreement would prove unworkable because realistic local agreements are
not yet common in that country. An enforceability measure standing
alone would, therefore, serve only to perpetuate the antiquated formal
system of collective bargaining. Thus, Government encouragement of the
development of local agreements-whether by legislative intervention or
some administrative alternative-coupled with legal enforceability seems
the best way of bringing the outdated formal system in line with indus-
trial realities. Unions and employers would then have to assume greater
responsibility for their local agreements, and unions in particular would
be forced to grapple with the problem of unofficial strikes. It would then
be likely that arbitration would be successful at providing a speedy and
informal alternative to court enforcement of disputed matters under col-
lective agreements.
13S Note of Reservation by Mr. Andrew Shonfield, DONOVAN COMmiSSIoN REPORT, supra
note 120, at 300:
The arguments that are commonly advanced for the contention that the contrac-
tual form is an inappropriate one for collective agreements are not persuasive.
They are regarded as having binding force in other countries, and no special diffi-
culties arise from that fact .... The proposal in essence is that the bias of En-
glish law, as it has been hitherto, should be changed. Instead of making it compli-
cated and difficult for unions to enter into contractual obligations which are
enforceable at law, so that it has become an eccentric thing for a union to do,
unions and employers should be encouraged to treat it as the normal thing to do.
For a more recent espousal of legal enforceability, see, Hit & Miss, TH EcONOMIsT, Nov-
ember 28, 1981, at 15: "The overwhelming number of British stoppages break out before
union officials have worked their way through laid-down disputes procedures. Britain's long-
term aim should be to make collective agreements as binding as any other contracts."
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The future of labor arbitration in Britain is, therefore, inextricably
bound up with the question of legal enforcement of collective agreements.
Present trends in British labor relations indicate that the prospects for a
popular system of artibration of labor disputes seem as bleak as those for
the legal enforceability. It is hoped though that the worsening labor rela-
tions situation in Britain may one day indicate that the implementation
of these arbitration measures has been not eliminated, but merely
postponed.

